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The Five Marks of the Mental
Tuomas K. Pernu1,2*
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The mental realm seems different to the physical realm; the mental is thought to be
dependent on, yet distinct from the physical. But how, exactly, are the two realms
supposed to be different, and what, exactly, creates the seemingly insurmountable
juxtaposition between the mental and the physical? This review identifies and discusses
five marks of the mental, features that set characteristically mental phenomena
apart from the characteristically physical phenomena. These five marks (intentionality,
consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity) are not presented as a set of features
that define mentality. Rather, each of them is something we seem to associate with
phenomena we consider mental, and each of them seems to be in tension with the
physical view of reality in its own particular way. It is thus suggested how there is no
single mind-body problem, but a set of distinct but interconnected problems. Each of
these separate problems is analyzed, and their differences, similarities and connections
are identified. This provides a useful basis for future theoretical work on psychology and
philosophy of mind, that until now has too often suffered from unclarities, inadequacies,
and conflations.
Keywords: access consciousness, folk psychology, free will, mind-body problem, intentionality, normativity,
phenomenal consciousness, teleology
INTRODUCTION
The mental, or the psychological realm is typically conceived to be different from the physical, or
the biological and neural realm. The mental is thought to be dependent on, yet distinct from the
physical. The two are not identical, and the former is not reducible to the latter – according to
many – yet they are coordinated with each other, and even in interaction with each other, or at
least so it appears. Many theoretical problems arise from this: the issue of how, or indeed whether,
the mind and the body can interact, debates on whether the mental is ultimately reducible to the
physical, claims that there is no genuine science of psychology, autonomous from the more basic –
more real – sciences of biology, neuroscience, and physics, and, most distressingly, doubts about
there being no such thing as real psychological agency and free will.
It thus appears that there is no single mind-body problem, but a plethora of profound and
complex issues, tightly intertwined. There is, however, one common thread in all these issues: the
assumption that there is something that is characteristically mental, a feature, or a set of features,
that makes it difficult for us to identify the mental with the physical, or conjoin the two. So the
question arises: how, exactly, are the two realms different, and what are the features and issues
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that seem to set characteristically mental phenomena irrevocably
apart from the characteristically physical phenomena – what are
the marks of the mental?
The following identifies and analyses five features that we
closely associate with characteristically mental phenomena. The
intention of this analysis is not to present an individually
necessary but jointly sufficient set of features that define
mentality. Rather, each of these features is something we seem
to associate with phenomena we consider mental, and each of
them seems to be in tension with the physical view of reality in
their own particular way. Each of these features thus creates its
own particular mind-body problem, that is largely distinct from,
although also intimately connected to, the other problems.
We are thus faced here with two tasks: first, to describe and
analyze the five characteristically mental features, and second,
to identify and unpack their connections and interdependencies.
The five marks of the mental discussed here are: intentionality,
consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity. Only the first
two of these are typically identified and discussed, with often
the first one being granted the title of the mark of the mental
(e.g., Place, 1996; Crane, 1998a,b, 2009; Horgan and Kriegel, 2008;
Tartaglia, 2008; Voltolini, 2013; Jacob, 2014; Neander, 2017). One
central aim of the discussion to follow is thus to show, or at
least to suggest, that the traditional discussion has been radically
incomplete. However, the issue of whether this incompleteness
is merely superficial is left largely unaddressed. The five marks
discussed here are to be understood as signs or symptoms of
mentality, and the question of whether these marks can ultimately
be reduced to one or two more primitive marks will need to be
answered separately.
The issues on focus here are profound and complicated, with
each of them having long and tangled histories. It is not possible
to do justice to all the nuances of the issues in the confines
of this essay; many central philosophical problems related to
each of the issues will have to be left unaddressed. Listing every
issue and discussing all the fine grained problems is not the aim
here, however, although deciphering such details is admittedly
ultimately relevant. The main goal here is to outline a bigger
picture – to take a step back and have a view from a distance,
if you will – and show how the single notion of “the mental”
will actually divide into a number of sub-notions, and how these
“parts of the mental” can be linked to each other. In other
words, the aim here is not to provide a complete treatment of
each of the marks of the mental, but focus on the characteristic
aspects of each of them, as marks of the mental, and sketch their
connections. Details are not irrelevant to such a project, of course,
but providing a consistent overall view is equally important.
THE MIND PROBLEM, THE BODY
PROBLEM, AND THE MIND-BODY
PROBLEM
Let us start by getting a clearer understanding of what is at issue
here. The term “mark of the mental” (or “marks of the mental”) is
often taken to denote the necessary and sufficient criterion (or a
set of criteria) that unequivocally defines the essence of mentality:
things (phenomena or processes) that have the mark, or the
appropriate set of them, are mental, things don’t, aren’t. The issue
of what is mental and what is not is clear-cut, in principle at least.
This is not the view advocated here. The marks of the mental
are here presented as points of tension, features that create a
distinctive contrast to the physical. Consequently, the following
is not only an analysis of the marks of the mental, it is also,
indirectly, an analysis of the marks of the physical. The two
realms are, in essence, inter-definable. This is not a superficial
terminological issue, but a deep metaphysical one: the notions
appear in our discourse only as contrastive signposts, and in
using one, one is always referring to the other as well, at least
tacitly. There is no “mentality” or “physicality” over and above the
distinct contrastive features that we associate with the two realms.
There are only pieces or aspects of each, conceptually linked to
their counterparts.
Consider an analogy: what are the “marks of the living”? First,
as in the case of mentality, there is no well-defined set of features
that all and only animate entities have and the inanimate lack. The
features that are typically shared by phenomena and processes
we recognize as living are such as growth and change in time
(at various scales), response to stimuli and long-term adaptation,
internal functional and hierarchical organization, the presence
of homeostatic mechanisms and metabolism, and the ability
to reproduce and pass genetic information across generations.
Second, these “marks of the living” are essentially contrastive in
their nature: they are features of the animate only in contrast to
the features that we associate with the inanimate.
The often overlooked result of this is that the mind-body
problem can actually be broken down to two separate, but
interconnected problems: the mind problem and the body
problem. It is typical to think that it is the mind part of this
problem that is somehow more vexing or intriguing, and thus in
demand of more philosophical attention. But it is by no means
clear what the “body” in the mind-body problem ultimately
amounts to (Montero, 1999). For example, there is the well-
known dilemma, originally formulated by Hempel (1969), of how
to define the “physical” in a non-question-begging way: either the
term refers to entities recognized as real by the current physics, in
which case we can rest assured that physicalism is downright false
(for our current understanding of physics is incomplete, and our
views will change and theories will get discarded), or the term
refers to entities of some ideal complete physics, in which case
the content of the notion is wholly arbitrary (for no one knows
what such a physics will look like and what sort of entities it might
posit).
The “mental” and the “physical” are thus bound to go hand-
in-hand, and in addressing one aspect of the mind-body problem
one is necessarily also addressing the other. However, this does
not preclude specific ways of emphasizing the issues. Since the
focus is here on the marks of the mental, rather than on the marks
of the physical, the following will thus look at the mind-body
problem from the former perspective. In other words, it is the
mental realm that is seen as particularly anomalous in contrast
to the physical realm (based on our current understanding). The
marks discussed here are specific anomalous features of mentality
that seem to shun physical explanation.
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It is worth stressing that the issue here is different to, and
wholly independent of, the question of whether the mental is
ultimately identical with or reducible to the physical, or whether
some sort of dualism is in fact the right metaphysical view
to adopt. In particular, it misses the point to insist that this
discussion presupposes some sort of Cartesian dualism, and that
simply renouncing such dualism would immediately resolve all
the problems surrounding topic. The mental and the physical are
in apparent conceptual tension with each other. The tension will
not disappear by fiat. To make progress, one needs to identify
the elements of the tension and address each of them. Maybe the
mental and the physical are identical, or the former is reducible
to the latter, or maybe dualism prevails. But whichever view we
are to adopt the decision should be based on a careful analysis on
what is really at issue – arriving at the right diagnosis is always
the first step toward an effective remedy.
INTENTIONALITY
Intentionality is the traditional and most widely recognized mark
of the mental. Indeed, to many, it is the only defining feature
of mentality. The idea that intentionality is both necessary and
sufficient for a phenomenon to be called mental is known by the
name of Brentano’s Thesis. Here is a revealing, classic quote from
Brentano (1874/1995):
“Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the
Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental)
inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not
wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward
an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing),
or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes
something as object within itself, although they do not do so in the
same way. In presentation, something is presented, in judgment
something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in
desire desired, and so on.
This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of
mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything
like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that
they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally
within themselves (Brentano, 1874/1995, p. 68).
What is important about this quote is that not only does it
introduce the idea that it is exactly intentionality that is supposed
to set mental phenomena apart from physical phenomena, but
that it does so in various different ways. Intentionality itself thus
divides into sub-marks of the mental.
The most prominent feature of intentionality is aboutness: the
fact that we ascribe semantic or representational content to most
of our conscious mental states. The peculiar thing here is the
relational character of intentional mental states, their “direction
toward an object.” We think, desire, love, hate, fear things outside
of ourselves, both our bodies and our minds. The objects of our
minds can, at least in most typical cases, be stated in propositional
terms: we think that it is going to rain, but later we see that it
doesn’t. The most central feature of intentionality is that most
of our actions can be explained by combining propositional
attitudes to propositional content: the fact that I took an umbrella
with me in the morning is explained by my belief that it was
going to rain; it is my belief, and the specific content it has, that
explains why I behaved the way I did. This is a very intuitive,
deeply entrenched, folk psychological way of making sense of our
behavior. It is well-nigh impossible to think that there would be
anything wrong with it, at least not radically, as indicated by this
other, almost as often quoted, but more recent passage:
“[I]f it isn’t literally true that my wanting is causally responsible
for my reaching, and my itching is causally responsible for
my scratching, and my believing is causally responsible for my
saying.... If none of that is literally true, then practically everything
I believe about anything is false and it’s the end of the world.”
(Fodor, 1989, p. 77.)
Another characteristic feature of intentionality needs to be
separately acknowledged. This is the feature that is Brentano’s
main focus in the quote above: the fact that the intentional
content, or the objects of our mental states are characteristically
non-veridical or inexistent (cf. also Meinong, 1899; Husserl,
1901). Now, it is not essential whether “intentional inexistence”
is a necessary feature of all mental states, or even the intentional
subset of them, or a merely contingent one. What’s essential is
that many of our mental states are clearly about things that don’t
exist. People think, believe, fear and wish, and even see and hear,
things that are not real, and the fact that the content of these
mental states is in this way non-veridical is not relevant to the role
that these states play. As illusions, hallucinations, and delusions
concretely show, it is often the non-veridical content of mental
states that we need to refer to when explaining each other’s psyche
and behavior.
So what, exactly, makes intentionality a mark of the mental
then? What is the characteristically non-physical feature here
that makes intentional mental states inexplicable – at least
in any straightforward way – from a physical perspective?
Intentional inexistence is one intuitively apparent way in which
intentionality can seem anomalous to us (cf. Crane, 2001, 2012,
2013; Priest, 2005). The inexistence in question here is specifically
physical, objective non-existence, not non-existence tout court,
and the whole point in turning attention to this feature, and
using this term, is to lead one to focus on the stark tension
between physical non-existence on the one hand, and mental
existence on the other; in other words, there is a sharp contrast
between objective, physical non-existence and subjective, mental
inexistence. Illusions, hallucinations and delusions, and all
other intentional entities, are psychologically real, but physically
unreal. That is why intentional inexistence is difficult to reconcile
with a wholly physical view on reality, and that is why it is a
paradigmatic mark of the mental; mental entities and processes
are within us – in our heads and in our minds – not out there,
objectively in the world.
Although it is easy to hold intentional inexistence as a
paradigmatic feature of the mental, it is worth noting that
some recent developments seem to challenge such an idea. The
fundamental thesis in the discussions surrounding the embodied
cognition and extended mind hypotheses is the claim that the
mind is not in the head, at least not in some notable parts –
that it extends to the whole body, and even beyond it (e.g., Clark,
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BOX 1 | Functional theory of mind in early imperial China.
Understanding the mind as a function rather than as a substance has a long
and intriguingly cross-cultural history. Here is an excerpt from a Chinese
treatise Shên-mieh lun (“Essay on the extinction of the soul”) composed by a
Confucian Fan Chên in the 500th century, portraying startling similarities to the
contemporary discussion (from Balázs, 1964, p. 266):
(1) Someone asked me: You say the soul becomes extinguished. How do
you know it becomes extinguished?
Answer: The soul and the body are identical. Therefore while the body
survives the soul survives, and when the body perishes the soul is
extinguished.
(2) Q. “Body” refers to something that lacks consciousness, “soul” to
something that has consciousness. Consciousness and lack of
consciousness are two different things, therefore soul and body cannot
reasonably be treated as one. I have never before heard it said that body
and soul are identical.
A. The body is the soul’s material basis; the soul is the functioning of the
body. Consequently, since “body” refers to the material basis and soul to
the functioning, body and soul cannot be regarded as separate.
(3) Q. But since admittedly, the soul is not the material basis, and the body
not the functioning, where is the sense in saying that they cannot be
regarded as separate?
A. These are separate names referring to a single object.
1997, 2001, 2003, 2008; Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Wilson, 2005;
Logan, 2007; Menary, 2007, 2010; Chemero, 2009; Arnau et al.,
2014). The idea of subjective, private intentional existence of
mental entities and processes would thus become obsolete (cf.
Malafouris, 2010, 2013). Note, however, that the extended mind
hypothesis is not an eliminativist or a reductionist thesis, quite
the contrary: the whole point is to expand the scope of mental
notions. It would also be a mistake to conclude that the idea of
intentional inexistence could now simply be dispensed with. If the
extended mind hypothesis becomes generally accepted, it would
clearly show that intentional inexistence is not a necessary mark
of the mental. But such a result would not change the fact that
intentional inexistence is a feature of many, if not most, of the
phenomena we recognize as mental.
There are also other notable ways in which intentionality can
appear anomalous to us, which relate more to the aboutness
aspect of intentionality. Much of the past 40 years of philosophy
of mind has been focusing on the issue of the semantic content of
mental states – what is it, and how to account for it in perfectly
physicalistic terms. The issue in focus can be seen to originate
from the rejection of substance dualism: the mind is not viewed
as a distinct entity separate from the body, subsisting in its own
realm of reality, but as a cluster of mental faculties that are
grounded in perfectly physical entities and processes. In other
words, mentality is a function rather than a substance, and the
seemingly insurmountable metaphysical disparity between the
mind and the body can be seen to amount to nothing more
peculiar than the difference between the software and hardware
in a digital computer; the mind is something that simply does the
computing on the basis of the input (stimuli), and then produces
an output (behavior) (see Box 1).
So far so good. The age-old metaphysical puzzle on the
relationship of the mind and the body seems to finally now
be solved, and, most importantly, in a way that preserves a
distinctive but perfectly natural role for the mind. However, a
closer look reveals that something important seems to be left out:
it is in the very idea of computation that it is a wholly syntactic
process, whereas the hallmark of mental processes is that they
are based on semantic content. The functionalist solution to the
mind-body problem seems to leave the mind rather empty (e.g.,
Stich, 1983; Field, 2001).
There are many ways to make this problem more concrete.
The fundamental issue to draw attention to is the relational
character of mental states, the fact that they are about
something – directed toward an object. I’m thinking about
Donald Trump and you’re thinking about Donald Trump and the
fact that we have the same person in mind explains our behavior
(verbal discourse, let’s say) with respect to issues relating to
American politics. But how can our thoughts be about something
that is external to us? And even if they could, how could that play
a role in bringing about our behavior?
There is thus a tension between internalist and externalist
intuitions. On the one hand the contents of our minds are
something very private and subjective, something within us –
or so at least it very vividly seems to us. On the other hand the
contents of our minds are about things other than ourselves,
about entities and events that are both temporally and spatially
located outside of us – or so at least it feels natural for us to
think. The core of the problem is that to tackle the issue we
cannot just simply move everything within us, or within our
minds, as one might at first eagerly suggest: our minds, or at
least their intentional content, were supposed to represent things
outside themselves to enable us to coordinate ourselves with
the environment and with each other – that is the whole point
of having minds! It is simply a truism that representation is a
relation between that which represents and that which is being
represented. If our minds have representational content, then it
rather trivially follows that our minds, or their contents at least,
are necessarily relational, and therefore not within us. And if that
is the case, then it seems difficult to understand how our minds,
or their contents, could be in any way relevant to producing our
behavior.
How all of this creates a stark juxtaposition between the
mental and the physical becomes particularly clear when you
consider the initially attractive idea that the mind operates on
semantic representations grounded on brain, which in turn
operates wholly syntactically. Perhaps the most well-known way
to demonstrate the problem that arises from this is due to
Searle (1980; Preston and Bishop, 2002). Suppose you don’t
speak a word of Chinese. Imagine yourself now inside a closed
room which contains a huge comprehensive rulebook connecting
Chinese symbols to one another and describing how to respond
with a certain symbol when presented with another. Suppose that
there is a slot in the room through which you start receiving
Chinese symbols. You turn to your book, look the symbol up,
and respond by slipping another symbol back through the slot.
Given that the rulebook is comprehensive, as was assumed, it
would appear to any outside observer that you would be having a
perfectly intelligible conversation and that you would be a fluent
Chinese speaker. But of course you would not understand a word
you are “saying.” All that you did was following the perfectly
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formal rules stated in the book. The meanings of the symbols,
what they represent, would thus not seem to have any role to
play in producing your behavior. Similarly, all that you say and
all that you do is the result of perfectly formal processes run by
your syntactic brain, and the representations in your mind have
no part to play in that.
Another illustrative example is due to Dretske (1998, 2015).
Consider a normal vending machine, operating on coins. It is
natural for us to describe its behavior – the coordination between
inputs and outputs – as if it is based on the value of the money that
is being inserted into the machine: inserting a certain amount of
money – which you can put together in various different ways
by coins of different values – and pressing a certain button will
give you a certain item in return. However, value is a relational,
historical property: money has its value only if it has been
produced the right way in a right place – counterfeit money has
no value. But counterfeit coins are perfectly good currency for the
vending machine. In fact, it is pretty clear that how the machine
operates, and what it ejects, does not depend on the value of
the coins inserted, but on their simple physical properties – size,
shape, and weight. Similarly, the representational content of your
mind plays no role in the inner-workings of your brain and body;
your responses to the stimuli you receive are perfectly determined
by physical features of the stimuli and your body.
This is not meant to be read as a demonstration of the
utter insolubility of the problem of intentionality. There is no
shortage of elaborate theories of mental content, and there is no
end in sight to the debates raging between the internalists and
externalists. These theories would have no audience, and these
debates would not make sense, without a widely held consensus
that progress on this issue is possible. But what all this does
demonstrate, is that intentionality is a feature that keeps on
escaping our attempts to understand it in purely physical terms.
That is why it is a central mark of the mental.
CONSCIOUSNESS
Consider next another paradigmatic feature of the mental, a
feature that is perhaps even more familiar and tangible to us than
intentionality: consciousness. Now, it is clear that intentionality
and consciousness are connected in important ways, and often
many various different discussions of the mind-body problem
are linked to the issue of consciousness, one way or another.
However, the point here is to draw attention to the problematic
issues that are specifically due to consciousness, to identify them,
and separate them from the other marks of the mental. A lot
of confusion has been created by lumping together separate,
fundamentally different issues as stemming from “the problem
of consciousness.”
To zoom in on what’s at issue in here, it is useful to consider the
by now familiar distinction between the so-called easy and hard
problems of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995, 1996). The “easy
problems” are really not that easy, of course, and perhaps it would
be more useful to talk about tractable and intractable problems:
problems that we can see how to make progress on, and problems
that we can’t. Consciousness as a mark of the mental relates to the
issues in the latter category. (A similar, but more encompassing,
is the distinction between “problems” and “mysteries” introduced
by Chomsky (1975, 1980, 1988, 2000)).
The functionalist theory of mind can again be seen to lie at
the heart of the matter. It is not difficult to see the usefulness of
consciousness, in other words: it is not difficult to ascribe a causal
role to consciousness. Being able to make conscious perceptions,
and being able to make conscious decisions based on the received
information are traits that have obvious selective advantage.
Having a consciousness, and being conscious, obviously matters.
However, it is consciousness in the sense of awareness that
is the focus here. Being aware of your surroundings enables
you to coordinate your actions with the environment; being
aware of yourself, your body and your mental states enables
you to control yourself and your actions. Perception, memory,
learning, emotions, decision-making, action control – all of
these are important psychological phenomena under vehement
empirical study. Conducting such research is not in any way
straightforward, of course, but the phenomena are empirically
tractable – that is why it makes sense to do such a research. And
the reason for that is that you can easily see what sort of function
all of these different kinds of states of awareness ultimately serve.
Specifically, you can fairly easily see what would happen if certain
psychological faculties would be added or removed, or enhanced
or impaired; in other words: they make a causal difference to
those endowed by them.
So, issues related to awareness and cognitive processing are
deemed “easy” in the sense of being empirically tractable. But
there are other issues related to consciousness that are supposed
to be fundamentally different, and to be empirically intractable,
and therefore to be particularly “hard.” In fact, the situation here
bears a striking semblance to the problem of intentional content:
you can ascribe functional role to intentionality, and you can
ascribe a functional role to consciousness, but as soon as you do
that, the things that you were originally aiming to explain, and
the things that are characteristically mental, slip through your
fingers and you end up staring at a mystery. What slips through
your fingers in this case, is the subjective qualitative content of
consciousness.
Let us now dub the aspect of consciousness that is left out by
functional analysis phenomenal consciousness, and the aspect that
is attainable by such an analysis access consciousness (cf. Block,
1995, 2007; also Dretske, 2004, 2007): consciousness in the sense
of awareness makes both our surroundings and our own minds
accessible to us. It is phenomenal consciousness specifically that
is singled out here as a mark of the mental. So what then are
the exact features of phenomenal consciousness that make it
intractable to functional, and, therefore, to physical analysis?
There are two features in particular that sit ill with the
wholly physicalistic understanding of the mind. These are the
qualitativity and subjectivity of conscious mental states. You
can make even more fine grained distinctions (cf. e.g., Van
Gulick, 2016), but it can be maintained that any more fine
grained analysis will ultimately reveal only sub-types of either
qualitativity or subjectivity. Since the aim here is not to analyze
consciousness, but to provide an analysis of those features
of consciousness that set it apart from the physical realm as
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a distinctly mental phenomenon, this coarse-grained level of
analysis is justified.
Again, like in the case of intentionality, the philosophical
literature is full of vivid examples and thought experiments that
are meant to demonstrate the puzzling nature of phenomenal
consciousness. Perhaps the most cited and discussed of these is
the “zombie argument” (Kirk and Squires, 1974; Chalmers, 1996,
2009, 2010; Leuenberger, 2008): it seems possible to us, or at least
conceivable, that there could be creatures exactly like us, except
for lacking phenomenal consciousness. In other words, it seems
like the subjective qualitative features of our experiences – how
it feels and looks to us subjectively – do not make a difference
to behavior. Of course the fact that we are aware of things
through our experiences – that our experiences give us access
to information about our surroundings and ourselves – makes
an immense difference, as already stressed, but the way that
things are phenomenally presented to us in our awareness does
seem functionally superfluous. The zombie argument leads one
to approach this issue from the point of view of removing the
phenomenal consciousness – the zombies are lacking something
that we have – but you might as well ask: what would it take to
make zombies phenomenally conscious? Suppose you managed
to create a highly sophisticated version of Frankenstein’s Monster,
or an android that would behave just like the rest of us. What
is the extra ingredient you would need to add to make these
entities capable of being in phenomenally conscious states? And
moreover, how would you test whether they are in such states or
not? It seems that when you start to make progress in answering
such questions, you immediately fall back to addressing questions
concerning consciousness in the sense of awareness.
Another often referred to thought experiment is qualia
inversion (Locke, 1689; Shoemaker, 1975, 1982; Block, 1990):
it seems, at least prima facie, that if you switch the qualitative
content of your experiences, and replace them symmetrically
with each other, you will have different qualitative experiences
of things, but you will not exhibit any changes in your overt
behavior. You would now experience red as green and green as
red, for example, and your phenomenal consciousness would be
dramatically changed, but as long as this inversion is systematic,
it should not affect your behavior (cf. however, Dennett, 1988,
1991, 1993, 1994; Hilbert and Kalderon, 2000). Again, you can
also take an epistemic perspective on this issue: how do you know
that the qualitative contents of other people’s experiences are not
systematically inverted? How would you test that?
The relevance of the epistemic perspective to this issue
is particularly well demonstrated by the so-called “knowledge
argument” (Jackson, 1982, 1986). Imagine a scientist, Mary,
who specializes in color vision. Mary is not only brilliant, but
extremely hard-working: she has educated herself of all there
is to know about color vision, its psychology, biology, and
physics. However, she has done this, and lived all her life, in
a completely achromatic environment, and has therefore never
had an experience with a chromatic qualitative content. Suppose
that she gets a chance to change her environment and acquire
experiences with such content, and suppose that she indeed
changes her environment – has she now acquired some new
information regarding color vision? On the one hand knowledge
of the science of color vision remains intact; she already knew
everything there was to know about it. On the other hand she now
seems to be capable of having experiences that are dramatically
different to what she was capable of having before. In other words,
objectively everything is as before, but subjectively things have
changed dramatically.
The hallmarks of the physical are objectivity and
quantitativity. The objects of natural science are quantitatively
measurable and open to objective scrutiny; the results of research
are exact and publicly reportable. It seems that phenomenal
consciousness is in direct conflict with both of these marks of the
physical. Phenomenal consciousness is what it is like, and what
it is like for me, to have an experience, and that’s all it is (cf. also
Nagel, 1974). (It is worth noting that sometimes the subjective
character of our mental states is singled out as its own epistemic
mark of the mental (e.g., Rorty, 1970, 1979; Kim, 1971, 2011;
Levison, 1983; Farkas, 2008a; Tartaglia, 2008). However, one can
assume that such direct, first-person privileged access applies
solely to states of phenomenal consciousness.)
The philosophical examples and thought experiments
concerning phenomenal consciousness can easily lead one
to think that there is a principled impossibility in explaining
consciousness in physical terms – or indeed at all. However, that
is not the intention here. The only thing that has been established
is that phenomenal consciousness, its essentially qualitative
and subjective nature, seems anomalous from the current
physicalistic perspective; that there is an “explanatory gap”
(Levine, 1983) in that our current physical explanations do not
seem to reach the phenomenal consciousness. Some have indeed
claimed that this gap can never be closed, and consciousness –
the mental realm in general, but the phenomenal consciousness
in particular – will remain as a mystery (e.g., Huxley, 1869;
Chomsky, 1975, 2000; McGinn, 1989a, 1991, 1995; Pinker, 1997).
But some are more optimistic, and think that both empirical
and conceptual advances will ultimately solve the problem of
phenomenal consciousness (e.g., Crick and Koch, 1990, 2003;
Laughlin et al., 1990; Flanagan, 1991, 1992, 1998; Varela, 1996;
Koch, 2004; Lamme, 2006, 2010; Block, 2007; Fahrenfort and
Lamme, 2012). Others have an equally strong faith in natural
sciences, but hold that rather than solving the problem, their
advances will end up dissolving it – showing that there is really
no such thing as phenomenal consciousness, or a special hard
problem of consciousness, separate from the various faculties of
awareness and the easy problems associated with it (e.g., Dennett,
1988, 1991, 1992; Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992; Carruthers,
2000; Cohen and Dennett, 2011; Seth, 2016). Lastly, and perhaps
most interestingly, some hold that the arguments show how
consciousness is in fact an ubiquitous, primitive element of
reality – that some sort of dualism or panpsychism is the right
view to adopt (e.g., Nagel, 1979, 2012; Robinson, 1982; Foster,
1989, 1996; Seager, 1995, 2006; Chalmers, 1996; Rosenberg, 2004;
Strawson, 2006; Tononi, 2008; Koch, 2012; Goff, 2017).
The reason why the panpsychic reaction to the hard problem
of consciousness, or at least some formulations of the reaction,
is particularly interesting is that this is one rare occasion where
the tension between the mental and the physical is discharging
at the cost of the physical. As already noted, if we take the
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juxtaposition between the two realms at face value, there are
no obstacles for thinking it is in fact the physical that is
particularly anomalous, rather than the other way around. The
reason why the mental is typically bearing the burden of being
anomalous is simply because we hold the physical perspective
as primitive, sometimes explicitly, but more often implicitly.
The panpsychic solution to the hard problem appeals to many
because, first, the subjective qualitative features of consciousness
seem so tangible and real that it is impossible to see – by
those who are attracted by this view – how they could be
eliminated or explained away, and second, the gap between
the two realms seems so insurmountable that any attempts to
give physicalistic explanations for phenomenal consciousness
are bound to turn out to feel insufficient, or, maybe more
appropriately: fundamentally off-mark. That is why the physical
must give in, according to this view, and accept the mental to its
side as a fundamental, primitive element of reality.
All these reactions to the problems posed by phenomenal
consciousness are consistent with the view advocated here,
namely that phenomenal consciousness is a paradigmatic mark
of the mental. The panpsychic reaction fits in this particularly
well because it holds on to the irreducible and ineliminable,
and inexplicable, nature of the phenomenal consciousness so
tightly. However, even the downright eliminativist views take the
challenge of the hard problem seriously in the sense that they go
through great efforts to explain the phenomenal consciousness
away. So whether you are interested in defending the existence of
the mental, or explaining it, or reducing or eliminating it, you will
need to treat phenomenal consciousness as a mark of the mental.
Although one could thus find it appealing to single
consciousness out as a special, prominent mark of the mental, it
should still be stressed, however, that the issues of intentionality
and consciousness are very intricately intertwined. There are
at least four different positions one can hold, each with
their own nuanced subsects. Many – the “intentionalists,” or
“representationalists” – think that there is no separate, intrinsic,
non-representational content to our conscious experience; that
all our mental states are in fact representational (either directly
or derivatively), and that once we have got the story about
representations right, we have actually managed to solve all the
problems we associate with the mental (e.g., Anscombe, 1965;
Lycan, 1987, 1996; Harman, 1990; McDowell, 1994; Dretske,
1995; Tye, 1995, 2000; Carruthers, 2000; Kriegel, 2011). Some –
the “anti-intentionalists,” “separatists” (Horgan and Tienson,
2002) or “phenomenists” (Block, 2003) – maintain that there is
an independent, intrinsic and irreducible phenomenal aspect to
our conscious experiences, and that hence both intentionality and
phenomenal consciousness must be recognized as full marks of
the mental (e.g., Peacocke, 1983; Block, 1995, 1996, 2003; Kim,
2005, 2011). Yet others stress the fundamental interdependence
of intentionality and phenomenal consciousness; that separating
the two, and the ensuing issue of whether they are independent,
or which of them should be seen as more primitive or real,
is misguided (e.g., McGinn, 1989b; Shoemaker, 1996; Siewert,
1998). And finally, there are those who see phenomenal
consciousness as primary, grounding the representational
content of our experience (Horgan and Tienson, 2002; Pitt, 2004;
Farkas, 2008b; Pautz, 2013). It is often far from clear where the
battle lines in this debate are drawn, and it is easy to emphasize
different arguments and slide between the positions. However,
the fact that these debates are raging, and they attract wide
attention, is yet one indication of the importance of phenomenal
consciousness as a mark of the mental.
FREE WILL
Intentionality and phenomenal consciousness are the two
typically recognized marks of the mental. Rarely are any other
marks brought to their side, and rarely, if ever, is the issue of
free will discussed in this context. This is very strange, for a
number of reasons. First, freedom of the will is something very
tangibly and intuitively mental; it is no doubt something that
a layperson would readily offer as an essential feature of our
minds. Second, numerous empirical and semi-empirical studies
addressing the fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind are
actually addressing, or at least claim to be addressing, the issue
of free will. Third, free will creates a rather obvious juxtaposition
between the mental and the physical: not many doubt that we
have free will – not at least without a long litany of specifications
and provisos – but few are ready to grant such powers to bare
physical objects.
Now, it is more important than ever to choose one’s words
carefully. It is by no means clear what the notion of “free will”
is supposed to mean, and what the problem, and the proposed
solutions, are exactly amounting to. There is thus a great deal
of conceptual thicket to clear, even more than in the previous
cases. One must also be careful not to confuse the analysis of the
notion of free will with the project of defending its existence, or
a particular interpretation of it. It is one thing to get clear what
we should mean by the notion, be that one or many things, and
another thing to show that it has a scope. As before, it might very
well turn out that adopting some sort of an eliminativist view is
the right way to go.
Traditionally, the main problem is the apparent conflict
between free will and determinism: if everything that happens
is completely determined by prior events, so too our decisions
and actions, whatever we do, seem to be fully determined by
prior events. For free will to exist, determinism would need to be
false. But now problems arise. The falsity of determinism implies
indeterminism – the two are supposed to be complementary
opposites to each other, at least on typical interpretations. So free
will appears to require indeterminism. But, as it is well-known,
free will seems to be incompatible also with indeterminism: if the
occurrences of future events are indeterminate, then they are not
determined by our decisions; arbitrary events are not willed. So
free will seems to require both determinism and indeterminism,
but also to be in conflict with both of them.
There is no consensus on how to move forward.
Incompatibilists stress the conflict between determinism,
and seek – if they still believe that there is, or should be, such
a thing as free will – to find ways to make free will compatible
with indeterminism (e.g., Campbell, 1951; Chisholm, 1964;
Lehrer, 1968; van Inwagen, 1983, 2000, 2004, 2008; Kane,
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1999). Incompatibilists are thus typically incompatibilists with
respect to determinism, but compatibilists with respect to
indeterminism. Compatibilists, on the other hand, are eager to
stress the conflict between indeterminism, and seek to find ways
to make free will compatible with determinism (e.g., Moore,
1903; Schlick, 1930; Ayer, 1954; Smart, 1961; Lewis, 1981; Smith,
1997, 2003; Vihvelin, 2000, 2004, 2011, 2013; Berofsky, 2002;
Fara, 2008). Compatibilists are thus typically compatibilists with
respect to determinism, but incompatibilists with respect to
indeterminism.
This is not a treatise on free will, and there is no point in
recounting all the nuanced debates between compatibilists and
incompatibilists. However, it is important to point to a central
issue that connects the two camps. Both compatibilists and
incompatibilists take moral responsibility as a non-negotiable
starting point, and both tend to agree that moral responsibility
requires free will, but depart on the issue of whether moral
responsibility is in conflict with determinism. Incompatibilists
think that in making decisions you must be facing genuine
alternatives in order for you to be able to choose your actions
freely and be responsible for your actions. Compatibilists
think that no such genuine alternatives are required for moral
responsibility. All that is needed is that you are free from coercion
and that your actions are based the right way on your mental
states and on your reasons for acting – that you have genuine
moral agency. As determinism can be made compatible with all
this, it is no real threat to free will. All this has some important
consequences for assessing the role of free will as a mark of the
mental.
The first thing to note is that although logic dictates that
determinism and indeterminism should be on a par with each
other – since they appear to be mutually exclusive alternatives
and both in conflict with free will – it is the former of the
two that occupies a special place in the debate. After all,
it is their relationship with determinism that identifies the
two camps: compatibilism is determinism-compatibilism and
incompatibilism is determinism-incompatibilism. Determinism
has thus a special role to play in defining the nature of free will, at
least psychologically.
The conflict between determinism and free will holds also a
key to understanding how free will can be singled out as a mark
of the mental. Determinism is closely related to the notion of
“causal determinism,” the idea that every event, or at least every
event that has a cause, has a complete, sufficient cause – that
the occurrence of the cause-event was all that was needed for
the effect-event to occur, and that citing the cause would thus
provide a full explanation of the effect. One of the core theses
of physicalism, on the other hand, is the idea that the physical
realm is causally complete: that each physical event that has a
cause has a sufficient physical cause. All the physical events would
thus seem to be completely physically determined. And if all our
mental states and all our actions are necessarily physically based,
then it seems that whatever we think, and whatever we do, is fully
determined by the physical courses of events. Free will appears
now as an anomaly because it seems to require that we would be
able to break the physical course of events and inject a distinct,
mental causal influence on the world.
There are two separate problems here, that get easily conflated.
The first is the problem of mental causation: the question of
how can the mental, qua mental, have an independent effect
on the material world. The proviso “qua mental” is essential
here. Perhaps nothing seems more concretely real to us than the
ability to change things and affect the courses of events around
us by simply acting according to our conscious decisions. That
is, we have a very strong intuitive feeling that these actions are
emanating from us as conscious, and self-conscious, subjects, and
not as physical objects. Even if you would be convinced that the
mental and the physical are in fact identical, this feeling cannot
be easily erased. That is why free will, in the sense of autonomous
mental causation, deserves to be singled out as a mark of the
mental.
It is all but clear, however, how exactly the issue of mental
causation and free will are related (cf. Bernstein and Wilson,
2016). One could be eager to think that mental causation, in
the sense just described, is a necessary requirement for moral
agency and free will (cf. e.g., Kim, 2007). However, at least some
compatibilist accounts, which interpret free will simply as an
absence of coercion, could leave room for free will without mental
causation. That does not mean that the issue of mental causation
isn’t relevant in its own right, of course – it would just be wrong
to discuss it under the title of “free will.”
Note also that the problem of mental causation does not
arise from the assumption of determinism, not at least without
some further specifications. Rather, the root of the problem is in
the assumption that the physical level is causally complete (and
that mental states are fully based on physical states). Supposing
that mental causes are not systematic overdeterminers – that in
each purported case of mental causation there exists both a full
physical and a full mental cause for the given effect – mental
causes seem to be left with a wholly otiose role, and they would
thus become excluded by physical causes (cf. Kim, 1989, 1998,
2005). Nothing in this result seems to hinge on determinism,
not prima facie at least, but only on the causal completeness of
the physical. (However, as already noted, if causal completeness
is cashed out in terms of causal sufficiency – all physical effects
having sufficient physical causes – and if that is then interpreted
to mean that nothing else but the occurrence of the cause-event
accounts for the occurrence of the effect-event, one comes awfully
close to saying that given the occurrence of the cause-event, the
effect-event was determined to occur. Much thus depends on how
the notion of causal sufficiency is to be understood in this context
(cf. Suppes, 1970; Anscombe, 1971; Pernu, 2013)).
If it is the causal completeness of the physical that is at the
heart of the matter here, it is possible to formulate the tension
between the mental and the physical in a particularly precise way.
Although it would be too much to say that the two principles
are identical, the idea of the causal completeness of the physical
has apparent affinity with the first law of thermodynamics, the
idea that the total energy of a closed system remains constant (cf.
Papineau, 2002). Given that all physical events are either identical
with or based on energetic changes, all physical events would
now always correspond to other quantitatively equal physical
events. Whatever mental states these physical events would now
base, they would be prone to appear causally superfluous. It is
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not really relevant whether this train of thought can be made
completely watertight – one could point out, for example, that
the causal completeness of the physical is a metaphysical thesis
about causation and causal explanation, whereas the principle
of the conservation of energy is a physical principle based
on mathematical symmetries; there are obviously gaps to fill.
However, this does not have to erode the intuitive connection
between the two principles which explains, at least for a large part,
our difficulties in comprehending the idea of autonomous mental
causation.
However, mental causation is only part of the larger problem
the notion of free will is imposing on us. The problem of
mental causation is the problem of how the mind can, qua being
mental, have an effect on the future events of the world – or,
to formulate the issue in more poignant terms, the problem of
how the will, qua will, can have such powers. But of course
the problem of free will is more than the problem of the will:
it is, first and foremost, the problem of the freedom of the
will. And it is here where the conflict between free will and
determinism becomes most apparent: how can your choices,
your will, be yours, and how can you be free to make those
choices, and will what you will, if everything is determined
by things and events out of the scope of your influence? This
is the core question of free will, and the one that motivates
the debates surrounding the incompatibilist approaches to the
issue. So even if you would be able to offer a convincing
solution to the problem of mental causation, many would
insist that you would still have left the main issue completely
untouched.
If the freedom of the will is thus singled out as a source of a
tension between the mental and the physical, it becomes pertinent
to ask if the threat of determinism is merely hypothetical. After
all, according to the widely accepted paradigm the fundamental
physical reality is in fact indeterministic. Should we thus ignore
the threat of determinism, and maybe start building our view
on indeterministic quantum physics, as many are eager to
suggest (e.g., Eccles, 1994; Penrose, 1994; Hameroff and Penrose,
1996; Beck and Eccles, 1998; Stapp, 1999, 2009; Schwartz et al.,
2005)? There are many reasons to be skeptical of such a
project (cf. Pernu, 2011). First, simply trading determinism for
indeterminism would not get us far: we would still need to explain
how our conscious decisions arise from the random quantum
events. Secondly, and more importantly, the physical level that
is relevant to this explanatory project is fully accountable by
classical terms. This is not just an issue of all the physical
processes relevant to mental functioning taking place at such
a coarse level that all the quantum indeterminacies will be
canceled out (Tegmark, 2000). The main critical point is that
turning to quantum physics overshoots: “the physical,” that is
in apparent tension with “the mental,” is referring to a much
broader category than to mere fundamental physics. “Physical”
and “physics” are distinct notions, at least in this context, with
the former referring to a variety of macrophysical entities, such
as tissue, organs, and bodies. Whatever conscious decisions are
to be correlated with, they are bound to be some features of
neural networks, not single neurons, let alone their microphysical
parts.
To complicate things even more, it seems clear that in
addition to the problems of mental causation (the problem
of the will) and the problem of the freedom of the will (the
problem of freedom), free will is also related to the problem
of consciousness; intuitively, conscious decision making is a
necessary condition of free will (Shepherd, 2012, 2015). However,
it should be fairly incontestable that it is not consciousness
in the sense of phenomenal consciousness, but in the sense
of access consciousness, that we are facing here: we need to
be, at least prima facie, aware of our decisions and actions
in order for us to be acting on the basis of free will. There
are at least two separate issues here. First, it seems that free
will requires a sense of selfhood, that the subject of free will
is conscious of herself as an autonomous agent and a source
of her actions. Second, it seems that the subject needs to be
aware of her decisions and the actions she is making based
on her decisions – she needs to be acting purposefully, with
an intentional effort to produce specific outcomes. In other
words, free will seems to require both self-awareness and action-
awareness (Gallagher (2000a,b, 2008, 2015) proposes a related
distinction). These two aspects of awareness account for the
feeling that our actions, at least the ones that we deem free,
are “up-to-us”; that there is a proper sense of autonomous
control associated with the actions that are the results of our free
choices.
A number of empirical studies, conducted in various different
ways, have recently proposed a startling conclusion: that our
actions do not in fact result from our free choices, but that
it merely appears to us so – that we are under the spell
of “willusionism” (Libet, 1985, 1994, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006;
Wegner, 2002; Prinz, 2003; Lau et al., 2004; Soon et al., 2008;
Harris, 2012). Such a conclusion threatens to leave us zombies
yet in another way: now it seems that the thoroughly physical
(neural) description of our behavior leaves us without conscious
control over our actions (Vierkant et al., 2013; Shepherd, 2016)
(see Box 2). Whether these arguments are correct – and there
are many cogent ways of challenging them (e.g., Nahmias, 2002,
2011; Pereboom and Caruso, 2002; Levy, 2005; Waller, 2012;
Clark et al., 2013; Mele, 2014a,b) – it is worth making clear that
what they are really targeting is our conscious sense of free will,
rather than the idea of free will itself. That is, these arguments
might, if correct, pose serious challenges to the idea of the causal
efficacy of the will, or at least to the assumption that the actions
we deem free bear a necessary connection to conscious decision
making. So although these argument might not pose a direct
challenge to the idea of the freedom of the will, they do create
a real ground for concern since it seems rather obvious to us that
conscious decision making is a necessary element of free will.
Things are not that straightforward, however. Although many
accounts of free will (and consciousness) take it for granted that
consciousness is a necessary requirement of free will – to the
point where many treatments of consciousness are not actually
addressing the issue of consciousness at all, but the issue of
free will (and vice versa) – a moments reflection shows that
the connection isn’t necessarily as tight as it seems. As it was
noted, it is typically agreed that the idea of free will is strongly
connected to moral responsibility, so strongly that many are
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BOX 2 | Physicalism and three kinds of zombies.
A thoroughly physicalistic view of ourselves threatens to make us zombies in
at least three distinct senses.
Semantic Zombies. The physical world seems to be governed by wholly
syntactic, mechanical processes, leaving the semantic features of our mental
states – the content of our desires, beliefs, and perceptions – without any
causal role, and transforming us thus into syntactically driven zombies.
Phenomenal Zombies. Similarly, the subjective qualitative contents of our
conscious mental states, the way that things feel and seem to us in our
private experiences, seem to be left causally inert from an objective,
physicalistic point of view deployed by the sciences, thus prompting us to
treat ourselves as phenomenal zombies.
Free Will Zombies. Finally, recent empirical studies on free will have
suggested that our conscious decisions do not have a role to play in the
initiation of our actions, stripping us of conscious control over our behavior,
and making us thus neurobiological zombies, devoid of any true agency and
free will.
prepared to make free will compatible with determinism in order
to save moral responsibility. And, as it was also already noted,
this would also seem to allow the possibility of acting freely
even in the absence of mental causation. And if that is the case,
then it seems clear that it is also possible to act freely in the
absence of consciousness. This is actually not so preposterous as it
might first seem. For example, we often hold people accountable
for actions committed under the influence of intoxicants. In
general, loss of memory, or otherwise dramatically impaired
cognition does not necessarily make us strip the subject of free
will. Or consider absent-mindedness, or routine actions. We
do various different things absent-mindedly: we dress up, have
a walk, do shopping, and even conduct conversations without
being fully aware of what we are doing. Yet, we assume that
all these things are done perfectly freely – we are, after all,
blameworthy for our absent-mindedness. Or consider the case of
playing an instrument. When you are practizing a song to play,
you need to concentrate on your playing and on making very
fine grained motor actions. However, after you have mastered
the song, and you play it routinely, you are not aware of all
these fine grained actions any more. Yet, it wouldn’t seem right
to say that you are not acting freely when playing the song
and acting that particular way. A credible case could thus be
made for severing the necessary connection between free will and
consciousness.
It can nevertheless be maintained that consciousness, both
in the sense of self-awareness and in the sense of action-
awareness, is a feature typically associated with free will, and one
of the factors that adds to the feeling that the mental realm is
strongly distinct from the physical realm. One could even hold
on to the idea of a necessary connection between free will and
consciousness by devising an argument showing how in cases
where the connection is putatively severed, you can actually
always trace the chain of events to a point where a fully conscious
decision was made (e.g., you consciously chose to consume the
intoxicants, and you consciously chose to practice the song and
perform it routinely – you didn’t do these things by mistake, and
nobody forced you to do them).
One could thus conclude that there are three distinct
components in the idea of free will that create the tension between
the mental and the physical: awareness of the will, causal efficacy
of the will, and freedom of the will. It seems fairly clear that the
first one of these reduces to a special case of access consciousness,
to self-awareness and action-awareness. The latter two, however,
are more at the core of the identity of free will as a distinct mark of
the mental (cf. Watson, 1987; Ekstrom, 2011). The causal efficacy
of the will is a problem due to the physical realm being causally
complete and thus excluding any distinct mental influences. The
freedom of the will is a problem due to the physical realm being
governed by deterministic laws, thus leaving no room for the
conscious will to choose among alternative courses of actions.
TELEOLOGY
The notion of teleology is also something that does not figure in
typical discussions on the marks of the mental. And, again, this
is rather strange. Folk psychology routinely employs teleological
notions in explaining our behavior: we act in the way we do
because we have particular goals in mind. But purely physical
explanations eschew such teleology: the occurrence of events are
explained by citing antecedently occurred events, not by citing
the events that occurred consequently. Natural processes are not
goal-directed, conscious behaving essentially is. There seems to
be quite an obvious tension between the mental and the physical
views on the world.
Teleology has rather apparent links to the previously
introduced marks of the mental. First, many intentional states
seem to have a teleological component in them: your thoughts
are directed to the future events – you believe it is going to rain
later, and you desire not to get wet then – which explains your
current behavior – that you took an umbrella with you. Most
blatantly: most of our actions are intentional – we strive for the
results of our actions purposely. Second, “acting intentionally”
seems to be almost equivalent to “acting consciously”: when we
act purposely we act with certain goals in our minds – in other
words, we are aware both of the goals and our strive toward them.
Third, “acting intentionally” seems also to be almost equivalent
to “acting in accordance with free will”: not only are intentional
actions accompanied by the sense of awareness that they originate
from conscious decisions, they are also morally aggravating.
Teleological notions are thus at the heart of mentality.
It is instructive to approach this theme from a historical point
of view. One conspicuous feature of the evolution of the natural
sciences is the gradual decline of teleological notions. Aristotle,
most famously, took teleology to be the corner stone of scientific
explanation (e.g., Johnson, 2005; Leunissen, 2010). Entities have,
according to him, natural tendencies of being in change or being
in rest. The effect of gravity on material objects, for example, is
explained by pointing to the natural tendency of objects to move
toward their natural places, i.e., toward the surface of the earth.
Moreover, the full explanation of events, at least in most typical
cases, must cite all the four distinct causes of the events: efficient,
final, formal, and material. Of these the second, final cause, is
explanatorily prior: although citing all these causes amount to
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different ways of replying to the question “why?,” it is replying
to the question in the sense of “what for?” that is most revealing
to us. The main reason for this is that answering such questions
will give us understanding of the regularities observed in nature –
such as material objects always falling to the ground.
It is important to realize that appealing to teleological notions
is perfectly natural for Aristotle. In other words, there are
teleological, natural tendencies present in nature and in objects
themselves; teleology is not a psychological phenomenon to
him – although appealing to final causes is particularly revealing
in psychological contexts – and he is not claiming that there is
some sort of extraphysical conscious guidance present in nature.
Teleology in nature is neither borrowed from our psyche nor
imposed by something supranatural, but natural processes are
inherently teleological. One could thus claim that Aristotelian
naturalism is the first attempt to get a grip on the apparent
teleological phenomena surrounding us in wholly naturalistic
terms.
The rise of mechanical physics abolished teleological notions
from physics, but they seemed to be harder to root out from
many other fields of science. Biology in particular was, and
still is, rife with teleology. In fact, one could raise the question
whether it would be more appropriate to identify teleology as
a mark of the living rather than as a mark of the mental.
There are at least three ways in which we become faced with
teleological notions in biology. First, the behavior of organisms
seems teleological: they seek to find nutrients and mates, and
to avoid hazards and predators – organisms strive to survive
and reproduce. Second, the ontogeny of organisms seems
teleological: most complex organisms develop from very simple
ingredients, and very reliably so. Third, and most importantly,
the functioning of organisms and the whole evolution of nature
seems teleological: organisms have traits that enable them to
function in appropriate ways, species match their niches, and
there seems to be a natural hierarchy from simple organisms to
more complex ones – with us humans at the top. In other words:
nature seems designed, perfectly tuned, in various different
ways.
The main lesson of Darwinism, of course, is that all this
biological teleology surrounding us should be understood as
merely apparent. What Darwin (1859) showed is that we can
make sense of nature in perfectly mechanical, causal terms:
species and their traits are simply results of natural selection.
A central concept of the Darwinian theory is adaptation:
organisms behave in a seemingly teleological manner, and have
traits that seem to serve a purpose, because they have been
adapted to behave in these manners, and have such traits. More
specifically: organisms behaving in these ways, or having these
traits have survived and reproduced in higher rates than other
organisms, and they have passed these ways of behaving, or these
traits (or slight variations of them) to their offspring. All the
biological diversity, and the seeming teleology in it, can be fully
explained by a differential rate of reproduction, which in turn is
perfectly in line with the mechanistic understanding of physics
and chemistry.
Given that we have in this way stripped physics and biology
of teleological notions, and that this development has been one
of the crucial reasons – if not the crucial reason – for the success
of modern science, it becomes pertinent to ask if the teleological
notions present in psychology could, and should, also be given
a critical treatment. This indeed has been happening. The key
to this development has been the gradual progress that has
been made in analyzing functions and functional explanation in
causal-historical notions, akin to natural selection.
Although there are significant conceptual issues to tackle,
and the philosophical work in this area is ongoing, a relatively
clear progression can be outlined. First, the theory of evolution
by natural selection gives a natural – causal-mechanical –
explanation of biological functions (behavior, traits, and organs).
Consider the paradigmatic example: the function of heart is to
pump blood (rather than produce a thumping sound). The reason
why it makes sense to ascribe functions like this to organs is
that we can easily see how they have been evolved to have these
functions due to them accruing fitness benefits to the ancestors
of the organisms that now have these organs – the heart has been
selected for pumping blood because having such organs enhanced
the organisms likelihood to survive and reproduce.
The next step is to fit psychology and mental functions into
this scheme. First, mental faculties can be seen as perfectly
analogous to bodily organs: perception, memory, learning and
other mental capacities have been selected for their beneficial
functions – as already discussed, it is fairly easy to understand
the ecological usefulness of access consciousness. Second, and
maybe even more importantly, there are various attempts
to solve the problem of representational mental content in
these terms. Roughly, the idea in these teleofunctional or
teleosemantic theories of mental content is that we can
understand representational capacities through their selectional
history: mental states have acquired via natural selection or
learning the function to represent spatiotemporally displaced
state of affairs (Millikan, 1984, 1993, 2000, 2004, 2005;
Papineau, 1984, 1987, 1993; Dretske, 1988, 1995; Sterelny,
1990; Price, 2001; MacDonald and Papineau, 2006; Neander,
2017).
None of this has to do anything with adaptationism – the
idea that all traits have a function for which they have been
selected – or with evolutionary psychology – the idea that
all psychological and social phenomena should be given an
evolutionary explanation. These are controversial theses that
are related to more specific concerns about where and how
evolutionary explanations can, and should be applied. The focus
here is rather on the completely general idea, that is practically
uncontested, that appealing to selectional explanations can give
us a perfectly natural understanding of how psychological
phenomena can be fitted into a causal-mechanical picture of the
world.
Although it is safe to say that there is thus a clear historical
trend of renouncing or weakening the role of teleological
notions in scientific explanation, it is not clear what exactly this
development amounts to. One could claim that with respect to
physics and basic natural sciences it would be correct to say that
teleology has been eliminated (however, it is interesting to note
that some remnants of teleological conceptualisation can still be
interpreted to be present in some corners of physics, most notably
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in discussions concerning the anthropic principle and the second
law of thermodynamics (e.g., Carter, 1974; Wicken, 1981; Barrow
and Tipler, 1988)). However, when we turn to biology, it might
be more correct to say that rather than eliminating teleology,
the modern understanding of biology has explained, or maybe
reduced it. Many debates are raging on how exactly to analyze
the notions of natural selection, fitness, function and adaptation,
and what their relation to the teleological interpretation of
these notions is (cf. Cooper, forthcoming). Mayr (1974, 1988,
1992, 1998, 2004) in particular has vehemently defended the
place of teleological notions in population biology; John B.
S. Haldane has been know to have quipped that “teleology is
like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her but
he’s unwilling to be seen with her in public” (in Mayr, 1988,
p. 63).
When one moves from biology to psychology, it should
become apparent that there is a rather obvious metaphysical
connection between the two: both biology and psychology are
thoroughly entangled with informational notions, and both are
focusing attention on self-regulating processes and systems.
Consequently, the field of cybernetics was established to study
the interconnection – and interaction – of the two domains
(e.g., Wiener, 1948, 1950; Crosson and Sayre, 1967; Sayre, 1976;
Bynum and Moor, 2003). The exact meaning of “cybernetics” is
notoriously elusive, of course, and the field is highly diverse. What
is noteworthy, however, is that there was an explicit recognition
of the need for a systems-level analysis of natural – and artificial –
phenomena. This in turn made teleological notions, and the
mind-body problem defined in terms of them, to creep up to
the center of attention once again. On the one hand it could
be claimed that the cybernetic explanation of self-regulating
and self-controlling systems can be understood in perfectly
physical terms: there is nothing mysterious about homeostatic
behavior based on various feedback mechanisms. On the other
hand one could insist that there is an irreducible informational
element to such phenomena: “[i]nformation is information, not
matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this
can survive at the present day” (Wiener, 1948, p. 155). But
whether cybernetics is seen as an endeavor to explain or reduce
teleology, or whether it is rather taken to show how teleology
can, and must, be accommodated in our scientific world view,
is not essential. Whichever side is interpreted to be the one that
is doing the giving in, the cybernetic tradition is yet another
proof of how the push from the side of teleology is concrete and
strong.
So even if a strong case could be made for the elimination
of teleology from psychology, one could say that the jury is
still out, and the verdict might eventually be more favorable
to teleology. Even downright realistic interpretations have been
suggested (e.g., Schueler, 2003; Sehon, 2005, 2016; Goetz, 2008).
However, as before, the main issue here is not the question
whether teleology will become eliminated or reduced, or whether
a realistic attitude is the right one to adopt, but the fact that the
teleological way of explaining our behavior is very natural to us,
and that it is in a stark contrast with the causal way of explaining
physical phenomena. That is why it should be singled out as a
mark of the mental.
NORMATIVITY
Normativity is again something that does not appear in
typical discussions of the mind-body problem, at least not
directly (Zangwill (2005, 2010) is an important exception).
On the one hand this is very understandable: the issue of
normativity is complex, deeply intertwined with all the previously
discussed issues, and hence not easy to give an independent
characterisation. On the other hand this is very unfortunate: it
could be argued that normativity is something that forms the
core of many philosophical problems relating to psychological
explanation, and it is also something that creates tension
between the physical, or naturalistic, way of understanding
the mental phenomena in a unique and particularly profound
manner.
So what is normativity and how should it figure as a mark of
the mental? Normativity relates to norms, to what is considered
to be right or correct, and to what ought to be, in contrast to what
merely happens to be. The general characterisation of normativity
as a mark of the mental is this: there seem to be normative
constraints, utilized in various different ways, on how to ascribe
mental notions and attribute mental states to subjects, and such
constraints are constitutive to the mental states. The tension that
arises from this is, of course, that the purely physical view of
the world is not supposed to contain such normative elements.
Description and prescription are fundamentally distinct, and how
things are has very little bearing on how things ought to be – let
alone the other way around.
To see more clearly what’s at issue here, and to approach the
problem systematically, let us address two different questions.
First, what, exactly, creates the tension between the normative
and the purely physical views on the world? And second, given
that there is such a tension, what does it have to do with
psychological explanation, and the tension between the mental
and the physical? The tension between the normative and the
physical stems actually from an even deeper tension between
the normative and factual: from the apparent impossibility of
deriving norms from purely factual premises. There seems to
be a logical gap between these two: no matter how things are,
it is always possible to ask further how they should or ought
to be (Hume, 1738; Moore, 1903). Since this seems to be a
purely conceptual or logical result, it does not have anything
in particular to do with physicalism – idealism and dualism
would be equally ill-suited metaphysical doctrines for deriving
normative conclusions. Physical way of describing the world is
just one factual way of describing the world, and the tension
between the normative and the physical arises from its factual
nature, not from some specific metaphysical theses connected to
physicalism.
The connection between normativity and the mental is
more complicated. One can begin by noting that normativity
considerations are ubiquitous in human interactions. Language
and language use is one particularly clear and concrete example
of our normative practices, and one that is quite directly linked
to psychological explanation. First of all, natural languages are
essentially conventions, in syntax, semantics and pragmatics.
Mastering a language is essentially an issue of mastering a rule,
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or a set of rules; there are right and wrong ways of forming
expressions and using language. Secondly, there is a continuum
in which people can be said to be able to speak and use a
particular language. In other words, there is a set of criteria –
a vaguely defined and tacitly utilized set of criteria of course –
that we use to assess whether a person is able to use a particular
language.
Now, one can quite confidently state that there is a tight
and direct connection between language and the phenomena
and processes we consider mental. Although there are profound
debates on whether there is such a thing as a “language of
thought” (Fodor, 1975, 1987, 2008) or whether “private language”
is impossible (Wittgenstein, 1953; Kripke, 1982; Mulhall, 2007),
it should be quite clear that many psychological phenomena
have language-like characteristics, and it isn’t necessarily relevant
whether such characteristics are internal to some language of
thought or whether they are externally imposed on us. Not
only does it seem natural for us to characterize other people’s
psychological states in linguistic terms, it is also a way for
ourselves to become aware of our own mental states and their
roles in our thinking (cf. Davidson, 1974). But the way in which
such linguistic considerations bear relevance to various mental
phenomena is only one fairly obvious way in which normative
considerations mesh with psychological explanation.
There are at least two distinct and more deep-cutting ways
in which normativity penetrates psychology, and creates tension
with a purely physical view of reality. Firstly, normative issues are
closely linked with the issues related to teleological explanation.
In fact, the reason why teleological notions are difficult to apply
to purely natural contexts comes down to, at least partly, to the
fact that they have a normative element to them. As discussed,
it is tempting to analyze teleological notions in functional terms
and then give functions an analysis in terms of natural selection
(or some other causal-historical process). Organs, for example,
do many things, but the things they are meant to do – the
things they ought to do – are determined by their selectional
history. Similarly, it can be argued that our mental faculties,
and the semantic content of our mental states in particular,
are determined by their selectional history. In other words,
by appealing to natural selection – or to other historical and
purely causal-mechanical chains of events – we can define
perfectly natural criteria of the correct and incorrect application
of psychological notions.
One reason why this type of reasoning is particularly relevant
to psychological contexts is that it does not only give us a
natural definition of function, it also gives us a natural definition
of dysfunction or malfunction – natural criteria of when we
can correctly, and objectively, say that something has gone
wrong. This opens a way to understand diseases in natural
terms: diseases are deviations from the norm set by natural
selection (Boorse, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1997). Having such an
objective definition of disease would of course be tremendously
helpful in defining the proper scope of medical interventions.
Extending this approach to psychiatry and psychology would
be particularly useful: we would finally have objective and
operative definition of mental disorder and illness (Wakefield,
1992, 1997a,b).
It is easy to see, however, how this line of thinking is bound
to face problems. Many medical conditions, mental disorders
and illnesses in particular, have a strong social and cultural
component to them. Is homosexuality a disease or a disorder?
The problem is not just that answers to such questions seem to
depend more on our values than on simple biological facts, but
that nature itself always contains variation in all traits. In fact,
natural variation – that there are differences in traits, at various
scales, and at different levels of biological organization – is one
of the necessary conditions of evolution by natural selection:
there has to be variation in traits for there to be variation in
fitness, which in turn can then lead to cumulative evolutionary
change. Natural selection requires a variety of things to choose
from. Although the theory of evolution by natural selection can
give us understanding of how certain types of traits can become
prevalent in a particular population at a particular time, it might
seem quite of a leap to elevate this simple fact of biology to the
role of a normative yardstick.
Again, it is worth reminding that the issue here is not whether
normativity – in general or in the specific sense displayed in
functional explanation – can ultimately be naturalized. Maybe
such a project is feasible. However, that does not obviate the
apparent resistance of normativity to naturalization. The focus
here is simply on the fact that this resistance gives us a reason to
treat normativity as a mark of the mental.
There is another, although a related way in which normative
considerations enter into psychological explanation and come
into tension with the physical view of the world. This is the much
discussed dichotomy between causes and reasons (Davidson,
1963; Setiya, 2011; D’Oro and Sandis, 2013), or with explanation
and understanding (von Wright, 1971). In explaining human
behavior we are typically appealing to reasons a person is holding
for behaving in a certain way; we understand, or make sense of
actions by embedding them into a conceptual and socio-cultural
scheme. Causal-mechanical explanation of the world lacks such
elements.
Here is an example to demonstrate the stark contrast between
causes and reasons in explaining behavior. I travel a lot, and
I’m constantly flying to different places around the world. Often
when I’m on a plane there are babies on board, and quite
often they are crying, especially during the take-off and landing.
Since this has been happening so often, I started to wonder if
there is a reason for this behavior, and I decided to look this
up. And it turns out that there is indeed a reason for this:
the babies are crying because they are upset from gay-people
getting married (cf. Székely, 2015). Now, why does this sound
absurd? Mainly because we know that babies can’t have such
reasons for their behavior, in fact, we don’t think that babies act
according to reasons at all. We also know that there is a perfectly
good causal-mechanical explanation for this type of behavior:
the sudden changes in air pressure causes an uncomfortable and
sometimes painful feeling in your ears. You can try to alleviate
this only by actively leveling the pressure. Infants don’t know
this, of course, and there is no way of explaining this to them.
They cry simply because they feel physically uncomfortable. But
adults often cry because they feel mentally uncomfortable; they
have reasons for being upset, and we can try to understand
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and confront those reasons – and we can question and criticize
them.
This cuts into the very heart of the dualistic, dichotomous
image of ourselves as both physical and mental entities. We can
have both causes and reasons for crying, and in the latter case we
move into the social and cultural realm to explain the behavior.
And this realm in turn, and in fact the very distinction between
causes and reasons, is thoroughly normative. Whether it makes
sense to cry, for example, does not only depend on some privately
held reasons for behaving that way, but on the whole socio-
cultural context in which the behavior occurs. In other words,
there are rationality constraints to our behavior: whether we are
seen as psychological agents – and to what extent we are seen as
such agents – depends on whether our behavior can be seen to
meet some norms of rationality. This is the reason, or at least
one of the main reasons, why we are often reluctant to view
animals as psychological agents: their behavior is too far removed
from the norms we have set for psychological agency. Or, to
make the same point other way around: pet animals that have co-
evolved with us – cats and dogs – are sometimes eagerly granted
such agency exactly because they respond to our psychological
and social cues in a systematic and reliable manner, or so at
least it seems to us. But more importantly, similar normative
considerations are at play when we assess each other’s mental
states. If we find it difficult to put the things that a person says
and does into a scheme of reasons, we are prone to strip the
person of her psychological agency – we can actually say that the
person has “lost her mind.” Indeed, irrationality is the hallmark
of mental disorders and illnesses, and rationality considerations
bear heavily on our assessments of moral responsibility. Norms
of rationality play thus a key role in us ascribing mental features
to the surrounding world.
Further evidence for the thesis that normativity is at the center
of the demarcation between the mental and the physical can
be gathered by pointing to the links that this issue has to the
previously discussed marks of the mental. Teleofunctionalism, or
in general views that seek to explain mental content in terms of
selectional histories, are the strongest contenders for solving the
problem of intentionality. What really stands in the way, it seems,
is the issue of whether mental functions can be analyzed in purely
natural terms, eschewing normativity. Normative considerations
are also clearly linked to the issue of access consciousness:
whether, or to what extent, we are ready to ascribe such states to
subjects – whether we are ready to say that subjects are aware of
their surroundings and their own mental states – depends, at least
partly, on how well the subjects’ behavior can be seen to accord
FIGURE 1 | A figure summarizing the various components of the mind-body problem. The vertical lightning arrows represent the different points of tension between
the paradigmatically mental and physical features. The dashed arrows within the mental realm outline some of the various interdependencies between the separate
marks of the mental (the direction of the arrow represents the direction of dependence).
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with some preset norms of rationality, or “norms of awareness.”
And similarly, there is an apparent connection between norms of
rationality and free will: rationality considerations seem to bear
on all the different aspects of the free will issue, on ascribing self-
awareness and action-awareness, and on both whether subjects
can be said to act according to their will and on whether they
can be said to act freely. Rationality considerations bear on
psychological agency, which in turn bears on whether, or to what
extent, we ascribe free will and moral responsibility to subjects.
Lastly, the teleological element in psychological explanation can,
according to many, be understood in functional terms, which
in turn leads one again by the question of whether functions
can be analyzed without relying on normative notions. There is
also an apparent connection between reasons and purposes: we
act according to reasons, and those reasons only make sense in
the light of the conscious purposes we hold. Teleology is closely
associated with rationality, and one of the main sources of our
reluctance to accept teleological notions in purely naturalistic
contexts is based on our reluctance to impose objective rationality
on nature, and to take natural processes to be governed by reasons
rather than by causes.
There is an interesting outlier though: ascribing states of
phenomenal consciousness does not seem to be based on
normative considerations (however, cf. Kriegel, 2010). There
is a fairly obvious reason for this, and the very same reason
that singles phenomenal consciousness out as a mark of the
mental, namely its apparent resistance to functionalisation. One
could thus conjecture that the normativity considerations at the
core of the other marks of the mental are largely related to
functional explanation, and even if we would become content
with a perfectly naturalistic analysis of functions, phenomenal
consciousness would still be left out as an unanalysed, irreducible
mark of the mental (pace Kim, 2005).
CONCLUSION
There is no such thing as “the” mind-body problem. There is
a set of interconnected issues that together conspire against the
purely physical understanding of the world (see Figure 1). One
result of this is that the different components of the mind-body
problem could end up solved, or dissolved, in different ways.
Some marks of the mental might become reductively explained,
others might become eliminated, and yet others might retain
their identity as characteristically mental features and become
realistically interpreted (see Box 3).
Decisions between reduction, elimination and realism cannot
be made a priori. However, there is one important general note
to be made. It became apparent in many places that the marks
of the mental are very resilient in nature, that is, they seem
to be resisting elimination at the cost of the intuitive meaning
and metaphysical role of the notions. In other words, we hold
on to the notions, and rather make radical reinterpretations
and conceptual bending than eliminate them. Free will gets to
be interpreted in terms that are compatible with determinism,
teleology in terms of selectional histories, and phenomenal
consciousness in terms of panpsychism, and so on. Mental
BOX 3 | A break down of the different attitudes to the mind-body problem.
At least the following five different ways of reacting to the mind-body problem
can be distinguished:
Dualism (realism). The mental and physical realms of reality both exist and
are equally real; the mental is distinct from, and not dependent on, the
physical.
Identity theory. The mental and the physical are identical; there is a
semantic distinction to be made, but the two are ultimately the same. Identity
is a symmetric relation, so not only is the mental identical with the physical,
but also the physical is identical with the mental.
Reductionism. The mental is dependent on, and nothing distinct from the
physical; all mental features can be given a complete explanation in physical
terms. Reduction is an asymmetric relation, so only the mental reduces to the
physical, but not the other way around.
Eliminativism (antirealism). Only the physical realm is ultimately real; there
are no mental features and mental notions should be eliminated.
Revisionism and co-evolution. Mental notions will become radically
revised; they will not be eliminated, but we will start using them differently and
they will start referring to other things than before. There will be co-evolution
between the physical and biological understanding of the mind on the one
hand, and psychological and social understanding on the other, and there is
no a priori way of saying which of our mental notions will face elimination and
which will become reinterpreted.
notions are simply so dear to us, and so intimately connected with
our everyday practices, that they are bound to be explained, one
way or another, rather than eliminated.
There is a lot at stake – nothing less than the image of ourselves
as consciously feeling and acting, autonomous psychological
agents. It is thus understandable that eliminativism will meet
resistance. However, this does not have to make one to turn to
dualism. Mental notions could rather follow the fate of vitalistic
notions: we could come to see how there are no separate “mental
entities” or “mental realm” or “mental powers,” like we have
learnt that there are no separate vital spirits or forces. Such a
view does not have to amount to entailing that there is no real
science of psychology. After all, biology as a field of science
is now stronger than ever – and exactly because we learnt
to connect the biological realm to the physical realm. A lot
of discussion in philosophy of psychology has gone awry in
this respect. It is a mistake to think that for a science to be
autonomous it needs to posit its own irreducible substances
or forces. Interdisciplinary autonomy can be seen as a wholly
epistemic issue: making observations and constructing theories at
different levels of abstraction is simply useful to us. Psychology,
in particular, gains us useful information at the level of high
biological – and social – complexity. This should be enough
to defend the role of psychology as an autonomous scientific
discipline. But it is a whole other question, of course, whether this
will be enough to dissolve all our metaphysical worries relating to
the image of ourselves as autonomous psychological agents.
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